To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Covertly Manipulating a Twitter Debate on
  Vaccines Using Malware-Induced Misperceptions by Sharevski, Filipo et al.
To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Covertly Manipulating a Twitter
Debate on Vaccines Using Malware-Induced Misperceptions
Filipo Sharevski
DePaul University
Chicago, IL
fsharevs@cdm.depaul.edu
Peter Jachim
DePaul University
Chicago, IL
pjachim@depaul.edu
Kevin Florek
DePaul University
Chicago, IL
kflorek@depaul.edu
ABSTRACT
Trolling and social bots have been proven as powerful tactics for
manipulating the public opinion and sowing discord among Twit-
ter users. This effort requires substantial content fabrication and
account coordination to evade Twitter’s detection of nefarious plat-
form use. In this paper we explore an alternative tactic for covert
social media interference by inducing misperceptions about gen-
uine, non-trolling content from verified users. This tactic uses a
malware that covertly manipulates targeted words, hashtags, and
Twitter metrics before the genuine content is presented to a tar-
geted user in a covert man-in-the-middle fashion. Early tests of the
malware found that it is capable of achieving a similar goal as trolls
and social bots, that is, silencing or provoking social media users
to express their opinion in polarized debates on social media. Fol-
lowing this, we conducted experimental tests in controlled settings
(N = 315) where the malware covertly manipulated the perception
in a Twitter debate on the risk of vaccines causing autism. The
empirical results demonstrate that inducing misperception is an
effective tactic to silence users on Twitter when debating polarizing
issues like vaccines. We used the findings to propose a solution for
countering the effect of the malware-induced misperception that
could also be used against trolls and social bots on Twitter.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Social media, beyond networking people, has become an impor-
tant source for news dissemination and public discourse [3], [33].
Platforms like Twitter and Facebook are the go-to places where
most of the people monitor the public opinion and participate in de-
bates on issues with a high moral component like politics, minority
rights, vaccines, gun control, or immigration [59], [12]. A diversity
of malicious actors, exploiting the openness and lax content/user
verification of the platforms, regularly promulgate fabricated and
inflammatory content with the goal to manipulate the public opin-
ion and sow discord between the people participating in polarized
debates [55]. The commonly used methods are: (1) trolling - where
a user âĂĲconstructs the identity of sincerely wishing to be part of
a debate but whose real intentions are to cause disruption;" [26]; or
(2) social botnets - where linked bot accounts tweet and retweet mes-
sages in unison to create misperception of consensus on a polarized
topic or skew metrics of popularity and reach" [11].
Malicious actors in the past utilized these methods to create
misperceptions in political debates. During the US elections in 2016,
state-sponsored trolls infused both pro-Trump (Russian) and anti-
Trump (Iranian) fabricated and inflammatory content [66]. In a
similar way, content with an anti-EU sentiment was disseminated
during the Brexit campaign [42]. The troll accounts and social bots
were found to interfere with the #BlackLivesMatter movement [56]
and the gun control debate on Twitter [35]. A significant trolling
and social bot effort was also invested in a coordinated tweeting
and retweeting campaign to amplify the vaccines debate on Twitter
[8]. Aware of this nefarious use, Facebook and Twitter began to
remove trolling content and delete bot accounts [61], [67].
The malicious actors will likely continue to search for covert
alternatives to manipulate public opinion and sow discord through
social media while remaining undetected. To evade trolling detec-
tion and yet cause disruption in a debate, an option is to create
content with modified linguistic features that differ from known
trolling profiles and posting/tweeting behaviour [21], [2]. To evade
social bot detection and yet induce misperceptions, an option is
to coordinate the posting/tweeting activity to resemble a collec-
tive behavior characteristic for humans instead of (semi)automated
bots [44], [14], [4]. These and similar options seem logical and
might be expected to emerge in the next wave of trolling and social
bot activity. However, they all require substantial production and
dissemination of content and management of bot accounts.
In this paper we explore an alternative for covert manipulation
of social media debates by inducing misperceptions about genuine,
non-trolling content from verified users. Instead of crafting con-
tent and coordinating accounts, the misperception is induced by
a malware that acts as a man-in-the-middle between the social
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media platform and a user and manipulates how authentic con-
tent is perceived by the user themself. Studies on manipulating
online information point that induced misperceptions represent an
effort of a malicious actor to "lead an individual towards making
false or implausible interpretations of a set of true facts" [6]. In the
same manner, this malware covertly swaps, rearranges, or removes
words, hashtags, or metrics presented to an individual to induce
interpretation of a set of true facts to the objective of a malicious
actor. Using a malware to induce misperception, to our knowledge,
is a zero-day exploit because it allows the targeted user to verify
the authenticity of a post or tweet, thus bypassing all conventional
cues people use to detect trolling or fabricated content [16].
We tested the effect of the misperception-inducing malware
in controlled settings on a Twitter debate on the risk of vaccines
causing autism. The goal was to investigate whether this malware
can be used to engineer the spiral-of-silence effect on social media,
e.g. manipulate how users perceive genuine tweets and accordingly
express or silence their opinion. Spiral-of-silence theory argues that
if people perceive that their own opinion is in the minority, they are
less likely to share it in a debate, especially when discussing issues
with high moral component [45]. A sample of 315 participants
was exposed to a polarized debate on the risks of vaccines causing
autism. We used the malware to engineer a perception that a larger-
than-expected twitter population share the anti-vaccine sentiment
[7]. The malware was packaged as a web browser extension as
a low-cost option that allowed controlled use only in laboratory
settings (alternative packaging is also discussed in the paper) [50].
The results show that the malware could successfully engineer
the spiral-of-silence effect for pro-vaccine Twitter users, "nudging"
most of them to refrain from sharing their personal opinion or
endorsing an account perceived as overtly anti-vaccine. Since there
is an effort to aid users to counter social bots and trolls on social
media [64], we further investigated how a suggested, ready-made
response could help Twitter users disrupt the spiral-of-silence effect.
The results show that users welcome such an aid and prefer a
response attacking the authority of the anti-vaccine sentiment.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical
background of the spiral-of-silence effect and its materialization
in the social media landscape; Section 3 elaborates on the concept
of malware-induced misperception; Section 4 details the use of
malware induced-misperception to engineer the spiral-of-silence
effect on a Twitter debate regarding the risk of vaccines causing
autism in controlled settings; Section 5 reports the empirical results
of the study; The implications of the results for the next wave of
trolling and social bot activity on social media are discussed in
Section 6; Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 SPIRAL-OF-SILENCE
2.1 Theoretical Background
The spiral-of-silence theory posits that people whose opinions do
not coincide with the majority opinion, as they perceive it, tend to
silence themselves fearing social isolation [51]. These opinions are
usually on issues with a high moral component, e.g. politics, public
health, minority rights, immigration, or abortion [53]. The effect of
the spiral-of-silence is more likely to be maximized when an issue
that is controversial and morally relevant receives a great deal of
media coverage [50]. Therefore, the theory posits that people use
their media environment to alert themselves about the perceived
appropriateness of publicly expressing their opinions.
Historically, the spiral-of-silence was mostly investigated on
political issues with a limited focus on health or social issues [27],
[46]. When discussing non-political issues, studies have found that
the spiral-of-silence effect does not always materialize in the same
way as in political debates and discourse [53], [40], [45]. That is,
people don’t use the majority opinion congruence as the only deci-
sive factor for expressing their own opinion. For example, the issue
importance was found to be a factor predicting speaking out on the
topics of abortion and immigration [45]. Another factor influencing
the willingness to express one’s opinion is their attitude certainty
on the polarized topic. Since our study focuses on vaccines as a
health issue with a high moral component, we considered the "is-
sue importance" and "attitude certainty" factors when testing for
the possibility of engineering the spiral-of-silence effect with a
misperception-inducing malware.
2.2 Spiral-of-Silence Online
The spiral-of-silence theory, developed for face-to-face commu-
nication, originally considered printed and televised mass media
content. A true consensus on the majority public opinion was easier
to build back then and, thus also easier perceive because of limited
choices for media consumption or opinion expression. The Internet
changed the way people communicate by providing anonymity and
selectivity, access to diverse media content, and choices where and
with whom to share their opinion [20]. This change prompted tests
of the spiral-of-silence theory in the context of online communi-
cation. Authors in [32] suggest that willingness to express one’s
opinion online is also influenced by the issue importance next to
the majority opinion congruence, proving that this factor is also
relevant for the spiral-of-silence online. Authors in [49] have found
that the online environment affords people not only to explicitly
express an opinion (e.g. by writing comments in online forums,
social media, or websites), but also to take actions to implicitly
communicate their stance (e.g. reposting, liking, or joining some-
one’s else opinion). Because our study uses Twitter as an online
communication platform that affords retweeting, liking, or follow-
ing a tweet/account, we took into consideration both aspects of
online opinion expression into account when analyzing the poten-
tial of using a misperception-inducing malware to engineer the
spiral-of-silence effect online.
2.3 Spiral-of-Silence on Social Media
Social media interactions are anchored in real-world relationships
and people on social media express their opinions in ways to avoid
"appearing unpopular or undesirable within the social media com-
munity" [45]. Confirming the grounds for the existence of the spiral-
of-silence effect on social media, authors in [1], [9], [28], [25] and
[19] demonstrated the robustness between the perceived opinion
congruence and the explicit opinion expression on political and
non-political topics debated on social media. For example, authors
in [36] assessed the spiral-of-silence on Facebook in the context
of the 2016 US presidential election. Their analysis suggests that
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the more people perceived public opinion support for Hillary Clin-
ton, the less likely they were to share a divergent opinion on the
platform. Another study investigating the spiral-of-silence on Face-
book on the issue of freedom of speech on college campuses has
found that the perceived opinion congruence as well as the issue
importance, played a decisive role in one’s willingness to express
their opinion publicly [x].
The spiral-of-silence effect is evidenced on Twitter too, where
a study exploring people’s agreement with/opposition to nuclear
power plants has found that users who recognized that their own
opinion is in the majority had a positive effect on the number of
tweets they tweeted [37]. Despite this study, and perhaps few other
ones on issues with a lesser moral component (e.g. [38] or [63]),
the investigation of the spiral-of-silence effect on social media was
predominately focused on Facebook as a platform of choice. To ad-
dress this gap, we focused on Twitter as a social media platform of
choice. We also selected Twitter because it is the go-to place for vac-
cines debate and as such makes a relevant platform for testing any
misperceptions regarding the vaccine debate effectiveness induced
by a malware [8]. The Twitter interface also has a unique set of
affordances for one to both explicitly (e.g. tweeting) and implicitly
(e.g. retweet, like, block, follow) express their opinion, providing us
the opportunity for a more nuanced test of the effect of the malware
in engineering the spiral-of-silence effect on social media.
3 MALWARE-INDUCED MISPERCEPTION
3.1 Concept
Distorting an individual’s map of reality by inducing misperception
has become a significant problem on social media [6]. Malicious
actors using trolls and social bots flooded Facebook and Twitter with
rumors, fabricated content, and inflammatory comments to bias
people and sway their votes prior to the US presidential election in
2016 [3], [55]. They also engaged in strategic infusion of fabricated
content for issues with high moral component, such as the risks of e-
cigarettes or the link between the vaccines and autism [29]. The idea
was to "manipulate the perception of public opinion and sow discord
between people debating health issue topics" in order to perpetuate
a latent state of disagreement among the American public [11]. For
this purpose the malicious actors used a considerable number of
trolls and bot accounts who infused fabricated and inflammatory
content in a coordinated fashion.
The concept of malware-induced misperception is inspired by
these efforts but replaces the need for fabricating content or infus-
ing inflammatory tweets and comments. The malware also elevates
worries that the social media platform can detect a misperception
campaign. Instead, the misperception takes place on a local ma-
chine or smartphone where the malware covertly rearranges words,
endorsement actions (e.g. likes, or shares), and topic keywords (e.g.
hashtags) of a genuine social media post while the targeted user
is reading it in real time. Studies on manipulating public opinion
point that induced misperceptions are efforts of a malicious actor to
"lead an individual towards making false or implausible interpreta-
tions of a set of true facts" [6]. By targeting genuine content, the
malware allows the targeted individual to verify the facts and the
credibility of a source, thus bypassing all conventional cues people
use to detect "phishy" content [16]. The goal of the malware is to
covertly manipulate the data in transit and induce interpretation of
genuine content towards the objective of the malicious actor.
3.2 Implementation
The misperception-inducing malware can be packaged as a browser
extension (e.g. Chrome) or a third party custom Twitter application.
The malware usually is disguised as seemingly benign to lure a
user to install it in the first place. The social engineering persua-
sion through disguise is needed because the malware requires text
manipulation permissions that later will be leveraged for implemen-
tation of the misperception-inducing logic [62]. Developing third-
party extensions and apps is free and a benign software can pass all
the security checks before publishing [50]. For example, a browser
extension variant of the malware can disguise the misperception-
inducing logic and pass the security checks by posing as an "ac-
cessibility (a11y) extension" that claims the rewording is done to
help non-native English speakers understand English slang on so-
cial media [30]. The malware could be packaged as a third-party
smartphone app that, for example, provides user-tailored Twitter
experience by filtering hashtags, content, and users [54].
The malware implements a word/number replacement logic if a
target word/number is detected on the Twitter page. The malware
parses the Twitter content with a findMatch() function to de-
tect a potential and returns the opposite valenced word/number. A
textSwap() function then replaces the occurrences of the initially
detected word/number based on a configurable logic (all occur-
rences, only the first occurrence, or only if the occurrence is in the
comments section of a Twitter page). This is the simplest, low cost
and low complexity version of the malware. A malicious actor can
implement more complex logic where the linguistic manipulation
can take place only in certain parts of the Twitter content or only
in Twitter posts from a specific person or on a particular issue, for
example, only posts with the hashtag "#vaccines" but not other
hashtags. The string array of "valence words and numbers" need
not to be predefined in that a malicious actor could use natural
language processing and activity analytics to analyze authentic
Twitter content and adapt the rearrangement that makes the most
sense in the context of target individuals’ Twitter diet [x]. Using a
Markov chain model can be trained to choose replacement words
or numbers based on an identified corpus of Twitter content [13].
3.3 Pilot Test
For the purpose of our studywe developed themalware as a browser
extension in JavaScript as a more economic proof-of-concept vari-
ant. We conducted a pilot study with 24 volunteer participants
where we tested the malware’s potential to induce misperception on
a polarized tweet. All participants were 18 years or older, interacted
on Twitter through a web browser, and had prior knowledge of past
social media trolling, misperception, and fake news campaigns. The
preliminary question was to gauge whether participants are open
to using browser extensions for improved browsing experience [62].
Most of them responded they already do use various extensions
that improve their productivity. Some were aware that browser ex-
tensions could contain spyware and steal personal information, so
they look for legitimate extensions only on the browser application
stores. Few were aware of extensions that manipulate content, like
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the Twitter demetricator that hides the number of likes, retweets,
and replies to enable a more immersive interaction [23]. None of
them were aware of browser extensions that covertly rearrange
the Twitter content before it is rendered in a browser. This was
important feedback suggesting that it is plausible for a malicious
actor to employ a legitimacy-by-design to persuade the target user
to install a browser extension in the first place [50].
The pilot participants first encountered a genuine Twitter post
shown in Figure 1 that we adopted from [47]. We asked their "at-
titude certainty" and how important the issue of vaccines alleged
link to autism is. Based on that, we then asked what action they
would take if they see this post on their Twitter feed. Most of them
reported that they are certainly pro-vaccine,that the issue is very
important, and that they would probably retweet or possibly pro-
vide a short comment saying "Yeah, vaccines work" or "Vaccines
created adults; without them we wouldn’t grow up to a decent age."
Those that expressed anti-vaccine sentiment weren’t as certain,
indicating they would probably ignore the tweet.
Figure 1: malware extension "off"
Then we used the malware to covertly remove the word "not,"
insert the word "don’t" and swap the word "wrong" with "right" as
shown in Figure 2. We also covertly doubled the number of retweets,
replies, and likes to induce misperception that there is growing
consensus on the anti-vaccine side [29]. We asked the pro-vaccine
participants what action would they take if they see this new post
into their twitter feed. Most of them reported they were not inclined
to reply, retweet, nor like it. Some of them indicated they would
probably block the account because "it seems like #fakenews" or
"a bunch of trolls." The anti-vaccine participants mostly said they
would like the post and possibly retweet it.
An important feature of the malware is that it allowed the par-
ticipants, aware of trolling and fabricated/inflammatory content, to
verify the account (i.e. see the verification icon next to the account
name). The outcome of the pilot study suggested that there are
plausible grounds to suspect that a malware can induce mispercep-
tion about a polarized topic, for example a debate on vaccines on
Twitter, and with that socially engineer the spiral-of-silence effect.
This motivated us to explore the effects of this micro-targeting
alternative for public opinion manipulation with a larger sample.
Figure 2: malware extension "on"
4 ENGINEERING A SPIRAL-OF-SILENCE
EFFECT ON TWITTER
Social media platforms have been found to actively shape usersâĂŹ
perceptions of minority and majority opinion climates with their
content curation algorithms, and with that, "engineer" the spiral-of-
silence at scale by manipulating what outside content is presented
to individual users [48], [24]. In the past they allowed for fabri-
cated and inflammatory content to be infused by state-controlled
trolls and social bots that aimed to distort usersâĂŹ perceptions
of minority and majority opinion climates about polarizing issues
[36]. Recently, an emerging line of research is looking into how
the spiral-of-silence effect can be "engineered" on social media
as an alternative to the platforms’ news feed algorithms or state-
controlled trolls and bots [x], [x]. Instead of curating or infusing
fabricated/inflammatory content, the idea is to induce mispercep-
tion about genuine content using a malware that covertly alters
targeted words/numbers before the post is rendered to the targeted
user. In this study, we utilized the same approach to explore how a
similar malware can be used to induce misperception about genuine
Twitter content, and with that, affect one’s willingness to express
their opinion. As a polarizing issue, we chose a Twitter debate
on vaccines and the risk of causing autism, following the reports
about Russian trolling activity aimed to amplify this debate and
sow discord [8].
4.1 Research Questions
To explore the possibility of socially engineering a spiral-of-silence
effect in a Twitter debate on vaccines’ effectiveness, we set to an-
swer the following research questions:
Research Question 1a: How would a malware-induced misper-
ception about the effectiveness of vaccines affect one’s choice of ’opin-
ion expression strategies’ on Twitter, either a personally crafted tweet,
a suggested tweet, or no tweet at all?
Research Question 1b: How would a suggested opinion expres-
sion strategy, e.g. a recommended set of readily available tweets, help
one disrupt the spiral-of-silence effect on Twitter when participating
in a debate on vaccines’ effectiveness?
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ResearchQuestion 2:Howwould a malware-induced mispercep-
tion about the effectiveness of vaccines affect one’s choice of ’opinion
expression actions’ on Twitter, either retweet, like, block, start follow-
ing, or ignore a given tweet/account?
Research Question 3: How is one’s choice of opinion expression
strategies and actions on Twitter influenced by their authentic repre-
sentation when responding to a malware-manipulated tweet about
the effectiveness of vaccines?
4.2 Study Design
The study utilized an original pro-vaccine tweet shown in Fig-
ure 1 and a malware manipulated tweet shown in Figure 2. The
original tweet was based on the tropes commonly used to argue
vaccination effectiveness elaborated in [31]. The tweet had two
hashtags that are popular in the vaccines debate and came from a
generic "@Vaccines-Truth" account [8]. We used such an approach
to capture the initial reaction to a "new" tweet that was based on
real, authentic anti-vaccine rhetoric [5]. We used the malware to
manipulate: (1) the content of the tweet; (2) the wording of the
hashtags; and (3) the metrics of the tweet. The malware covertly
replaced the word "Many" with the word "No" from the original,
pro-vaccine tweet shown in Figure 1 to make it appear as the anti-
vaccine tweet shown in Figure 2. The original pro-vaccine hashtags
#provax and #vaccineswork were covertly replaced with #antivax
and #vaccinesdontwork. The malware also quadrupled the total
number of comment tweets, number of retweets, and number or
likes to manipulate the perception of the majority opinion and with
that to covertly "engineer" spiral-of-silence conditions. The mal-
ware therefore changed the number the comments to 32,the number
of retweets to 160 and the number of likes to 548 (the numbers come
from an internal analysis of the average metrics and information
sharing patterns on Twitter for vaccines-related hashtags [43], [5]).
Figure 3: The original tweet with pro-vaccine sentiment.
Due to IRB restrictions, we conducted the study using a survey
that presented the tweets in a controlled web browser and solicited
questions from our participants. This was done to eliminate the
need for the participants to respond from their accounts given
that the study was anonymous, and didn’t collected any personally
identifiable information. This set up also enabled us to toggle the
malware extension without the risk that the participants could get
Figure 4:Malware-manipulated tweet to induce anti-vaccine
sentiment misperception.
a hold of the misperception-inducing logic and code. The objective
of our study is not to disseminate or encourage a development of
similar browser extensions but to understand their effect, given that
they provide a very low cost approach for man-in-the-middle ma-
nipulation of online information (we discuss the ethics of our study
later in the paper). The participants were grouped based on their
"attitude certainty" and "issue importance" as either "pro-vaccine,
"anti-vaccine," or "ambivalent." The pro-vaccine and ambivalent par-
ticipants were presented the tweet in Figure 3 and the anti-vaccine
tweet in Figure 4. We decided to show an anti-vaccine post to the
participants who identified as "ambivalent" to eliminate a possibil-
ity that they will simply conform with the dominant pro-vaccine
sentiment on Twitter [7].
We modified the notion of opinion expression strategies exten-
sively used in the spiral-of-silence research to fit the Twitter in-
terface and user interaction, i.e. the act of "tweeting" [27], [32].
We also considered the fact that people who debate the vaccines’
effectiveness on Twitter regularly borrow lines or share links from
other sources [2]. Accordingly, we utilized the following opinion
expression strategies to answer the first research question: (1) self-
response, where people were left to express their own personal
opinion or tweet themselves; (2) a suggested response, where people
were offered to choose three response tweets from the tropes of
vaccine debate provided in [31]; and (3) no response at all. The
suggested tweets were crafted to appeal to the three most dominant
principles of persuasive rhetoric: authority, social proof, and labeling
[10], [41]. For the self-responding participants, we utilized the Lin-
guistic Inquiry andWord Count (LIWC) tool [58] for computational
modeling of the response language to further understand what kind
of response the misperception-inducing malware could provoke.
A similar approach for the modeling of vaccines’ stigmatized be-
liefs on social media has been utilized in [57] and [15]. Because a
Twitter user can take additional endorsement actions as a result of
self-expression on Twitter [18], we utilized the following opinion
expression actions one can take after reading a tweet to answer the
second research question: (1) retweet it; (2) like it; (3) block the
account that tweeted it; (3) start following the account that twitted
it; (3) or ignore the account/tweet completely. The likelihood was
measured on a 7-point Likert scale from "1-extremely likely" to
"7-extremely unlikely." To answer the third research question, a
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set of demographic questions concluded the survey by asking the
participants to provide their age, gender, and level of education.
5 STUDY RESULTS
Following an IRB approval for the study, we fielded an online survey
(N = 315) in the period of January 30th to March 4st. The sample
was skewed towards the pro-vaccine: 260 or 82.5% participants
indicated they were pro-vaccine, 32 or 10.2% were anti-vaccine,
and 23 or 7.3% were ambivalent. Six age brackets in the sample
were distributed as: 23.5% [18-22], 22.2% [23-27], 17.8% [28-32],
8.3% [33-37], 4.7% [38-42], and 23.5% [43 or more]. The sample was
representative with 175 or 55.6% identified as female, 115 or 36.5%
as male, and 25 or 7.9% as non-cis individuals (transgender male,
transgender female, gender variant/non-conforming, not listed, or
preferred not to answer). The level of education was distributed as:
32 or 10.2% had a high school degree or equivalent, 74 or 23.5% had
some college but no degree, 128 or 40.6% had a college degree, and
81 or 25.7% had a graduate degree.
5.1 Research Question 1
The first research question preliminary explored the effect of a
covertlymanipulated tweet with amisperception-inducingmalware
on one’s choice of opinion expression strategies. Table 1 shows that
when the pro-vaccine participants were exposed to an anti-vaccine
climate of opinion, only 28.8% opted out to tweet themselves. When
the anti-vaccine group of participants was exposed to a pro-vaccine
climate of opinion, only 15.6% opted out to express their personal
opinion. Only one of the ambivalent participants choose to craft
their personal tweet. Overall, these results confirm the previous
findings that the spiral-of-silence can be socially engineered using
a covert manipulation of the content of a controversial social media
post [x]. Misperceiving a majority of opposing opinion climate is
sufficient to nudge someone to remain silent, that is, refrain from
tweeting their personal opinion in response.
Table 1: Choice of an Opinion Expression Strategy
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 75 88 73 21 3
Anti 5 8 8 9 2
Ambv. 1 4 13 4 1
Total 81 100 94 34 6
The content analysis of the personal opinion tweets using the
LIWC tool [58], shown in Table 2, revealed that the pro-vaccine
participants show a less "analytical thinking" pattern (score = 39.41)
than the anti-vaccine participants (score = 51.42). Both scores are
relatively low, but this is to be expected given the limited space for
a tweet and hence an expression of a more elaborated opinion. The
pro-vaccine participants are much more confident in their position
with much higher "clout" compared to the anti-vaccine participants.
This result reflects the dominant, pro-vaccine sentiment on Twitter
[7]. The findings also add to the evidence that the people who
are not afraid to disrupt the spiral-of-silence and speak out are
the ones with "hard core" attitudes towards the controversial issue
debated [50], [20]. The anti-vaccine participants were way more
"authentic" (score = 85.21) and used a more positive tone (score =
68.66) compared to the pro-vaccine participants. We suspect this is
the case because the anti-vaccine position is rather on defense and
bears the burden to maintain the position in the face of new and
compounding evidence of the positive effects of vaccines [52]. The
only ambivalent self-response expressed a rather sceptic personal
opinion, tweeting in reply "There are academic journals that support
the link; but it depends who’s funding the study; it can be looked
at as one-sided and biased."
Table 2: Opinion Content Analysis
Analytic Clout Authentic Tone
Pro 39.41 60.68 19.7 45.21
Anti 51.42 1.2 85.21 68.66
The second part of the first research question aimed to under-
stand how a suggested opinion expression strategy, e.g. a recom-
mended set of readily available tweets, helps one disrupt the spiral-
of-silence effect on Twitter when participating in a debate on vac-
cines’ effectiveness. As shown in Table 1, the recommended set of
readily available tweets were a much more attractive strategy for
the majority of the pro-vaccine participants. 33.8% of the partici-
pants chose the authority option "All experts deny any vaccines-
autism link." 28.1% of the participants chose the social proof option
"Vaccines saved us!" Only 8.1% chose the labeling option "You are
a conspiracy theorist!" Only 1.2% of the pro-vaccine participants
opted to remain completely silent. Even more, this was the case for
the anti-vaccine participants with an equal distribution between
the authority ("Few experts deny any vaccines-autism link"), social
proof ("Vaccines didn’t save us!"), and labeling ("You are in a pocket
of Big Pharma") responses. More than half of the ambivalent par-
ticipants chose the anti-vaccine social proof to reflect their not so
"hard core" attitude and position. All of these are interesting results
showing that a simple aid in form of a chatbot could be provided to
people interested in participating in a Twitter debate to help them
share at least some kind of opinion. The design and utility of such
a chatbot, based on a popular approach used by Facebook [17], is
elaborated in the next section.
5.2 Research Question 2
The second research question explored the effect of a covertly
manipulated tweet with the misperception-inducing malware on
one’s opinion expression options. The participants were given a
choice of five possible endorsement actions and asked to provide
the likelihood of taking either one of them on a 7-point Likert scale
(1 - "extremely likely", 7-"extremely unlikely"). Comparing between
each of the groups, the results of a Kruskal-Wallis test given in
Table 3 indicated a statistically significant difference for the first
option (retweet the post) and for the last option (follow the account
that tweeted the post). The pro-vaccine participants were much less
likely to retweet an opposing tweet to their position, and they were
much less likely to start following the posting account compared
to the other two groups. Corresponding to the previous findings,
it follows that the malware is also able to "nudge" the pro-vaccine
advocates to refrain from any endorsement action by manipulating
the perception of the majority anti-vaccine climate.
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Table 3: Opinion Expression Actions - Test Comparison
Retweet Follow
χ2 13.622 14.573
Asymp. Sig. .001* .001*
∗p < .05
Table 4: Opinion Expression Actions - Mean and Std. Dev.
pro-vaccine
Retweet Follow
Mean 5.03; 5.72
Std. Dev. 1.98; 1.97
anti-vaccine
Mean 3.77 4.58
Std. Dev. 2.08 1.86
Ambivalent
Mean 5.13 5.45
Std. Dev. 1.57 1.71
5.3 Research Question 3
5.3.1 Opinion Expression Strategies. The third research question
explored how one’s authentic representation influences the choice
of opinion expression strategies and actions when responding
to a tweet about the effectiveness of vaccines, manipulated by a
misperception-inducing malware. Table 5 provides a breakdown
of the choices of expression strategies per age bracket in our sam-
ple. The percentage of self-responding pro-vaccine participants
is more than 20% for each age bracket. This breakdown, in line
with the findings in the first research question, further suggests
that an attacker interested in targeting a twitter population with a
misperception-inducing malware stands a roughly equal chance to
"silence" every age bracket of users.
Looking into the suggested opinion expression strategies, the
authority response was the most popular in all age brackets except
for age bracket [42 and older] - theymostly preferred the social proof
response. This gives more insight into how a malicious actor crafts
the misperception logic. The malware targeting 42 and older users
could aim to induce misperception that there is a lack of consensus
on the vaccines efficiency as we initially did in our study, but in
targeting the other age bracket, the logic could be driven towards
undermining any vaccine authority beyond academic journals. A
similar conclusion holds for the anti-vaccine participants in the
[42 and older] bracket, given that they were the most inclined to
disrupt the spiral-of-silence with a self-response tweet compared
to the other age brackets.
The content analysis per age bracket given in Table 6 revealed
that the least analytical in their responses are the pro-vaccine partic-
ipants in the age bracket of [33-37],but they are the most confident
ones in their responses (score = 79.76). The most analytical are the
pro-vaccine participants in the [23-27] (score = 47.43) and [28-32]
(score = 47.92) brackets, although with an opposite levels of con-
fidence. The least confident pro-vaccine participants were in the
[38-42] (score = 4.8) and [42 and older] (score = 39.15) brackets.
The [42 and older] however were the most authentic ones in their
Table 5: Opinion Expression Strategy vs. Age
[18-22]
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 19 25 16 6 0
Anti 1 4 1 0 1
Ambivalent 0 1 0 0 1
[23-27]
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 21 21 14 3 0
Anti 1 3 2 0 0
Ambivalent 0 0 4 1 0
[28-32]
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 13 17 12 8 1
Anti 0 0 0 1 0
Ambivalent 0 2 2 1 0
[33-37]
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 7 10 3 3 0
Anti 0 0 1 1 0
Ambivalent 1 0 0 0 0
[38-42]
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 3 4 4 0 4
Anti 0 1 0 0 0
Ambivalent 0 0 0 1 0
[42 and older]
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 12 11 24 1 1
Anti 3 4 4 3 3
Ambivalent 0 1 7 1 0
responses compared to the other pro-vaccine groups (score = 62.65).
The [38-42] showed the most positive tone (score = 92.40) while the
[33-37] showed the most negative tone in their responses (score =
8.95). Overall, the analytical thinking is relatively low, but as we
noted above, that is probably due to the limited word count for writ-
ing a tweet. The clout is relatively high for the younger participants.
Except the [42 and older], the other age brackets weren’t particu-
larly authentic in their responses. The tone varies per category with
no particular pattern. This result suggests that the misperception-
inducing malware is capable of provoking a stark, to-the-point, and
often negative tone self-response as a way of disrupting the spiral-
of-silence in a vaccine debate on Twitter. The content analysis for
the anti-vaccine and ambivalent participants per age was the same
as the one in section 5.1 (not included in the table).
Table 7 provides a breakdown of opinion expression strategies
per gender identity in our sample. The pro-vaccine male partici-
pants weremore inclined to self-express than the female and non-cis
participants. The pro-vaccine male participants also preferred the
authority response while the female and non-cis participants were
equally interested in both the authority and social proof responses.
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Table 6: Opinion Content Analysis per Age Bracket
pro-vaccine
Analytic Clout Authentic Tone
18-22 37.20 76.16 26.07 40.86
23-27 47.43 72.17 16.38 33.00
28-32 47.92 47.20 8.05 77.29
33-37 24.62 79.76 3.01 8.95
38-42 27.87 4.80 14.24 92.40
42+ 31.95 39.15 62.65 42.41
It follows that the malware can particularly target female and non-
cis users to induce misperception with various logic and nudge
them to silence their opinion.
Interestingly, the anti-vaccine and ambivalent female partici-
pants were more inclined to self-respond to the pro-vaccine tweet
compared to the male and non-cis participants. From the malware-
inducing misperception perspective, the results suggest that anti-
vaccine females could be nudged to disrupt the spiral-of-silence as
a result of their "hard core" attitudes and beliefs in their position
if the the malware was used to make an originally anti-vaccine
tweet appear as it is pro-vaccine (opposite of our study). Such a
predisposition has been a predictor for similar behaviour in studies
concerning the spiral-of-silence effect on social media [x], [20].
Table 7: Opinion Expression Strategy vs. Gender
Female
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 34 49 46 10 2
Anti 4 3 3 4 2
Ambivalent 1 3 10 3 0
Male
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 36 34 23 9 0
Anti 1 2 3 4 0
Ambivalent 0 1 2 0 0
Non-Cis
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 3 4 4 2 1
Anti 0 2 1 1 0
Ambivalent 0 0 1 1 0
The content analysis per gender identity in Table 8 revealed
that the least analytical are the pro-vaccine female participants
(score =30.86) while the most analytical are the non-cis participants
(score = 44.96). The non-cis pro-vaccine participants are the most
confident in sharing their opinion (score = 91.35), but they are less
authentic than male pro-vaccine participants (score = 20.26) and
less positive in tone (score = 48.81). These findings confirm the
provoking effect of the malware on the willingness to express one’s
opinion on social media when controlling for gender identity [x].
We have included the anti-vaccine content analysis only for the
female participants (the anti-vaccine male/non-cis and the ambiva-
lent participants responses were missing or were the same as in
section 5.1). The anti-vaccine female participants were more an-
alytical than any pro-vaccine participants (score = 50.06), much
less confident (score = 1.00), far more authentic (score = 87.1) and
responded in a much more positive tone (score = 95.29). This result
also gives further insight into our previous observation of "hard
core" anti-vaccine beliefs. It appears that to defend this position,
one needs to be more analytical, more positive, and more authentic
if they are to compensate for the eroded confidence in face of new
evidence about vaccines’ effectiveness [60].
Table 8: Opinion Content Analysis per Gender Identity
pro-vaccine
Analytic Clout Authentic Tone
Female 30.68 65.97 9.44 34.71
Male 39.12 58.34 20.26 48.81
Non-Cis 44.96 91.35 11.00 3.73
anti-vaccine
Analytic Clout Authentic Tone
Female 50.06 1.00 87.51 95.29
Table 9 provides a breakdown of the opinion expressions strate-
gies per level of education in our sample. The participants with
higher degrees were more inclined to self-respond, regardless of
their position on the vaccines’ effectiveness. The pro-vaccine par-
ticipants with a high school degree and graduate degree preferred
the social proof response over the authority response compared
to the other groups. From a misperception-inducing perspective,
these results suggest that level of education influences the targeting
users with the malware. This susceptibility to a vaccine sentiment
based on one’s level of education was also observed in [60].
Table 9: Opinion Expression Strategy vs. Education
High school degree or equivalent
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 4 6 11 0 1
Anti 0 4 1 1 0
Ambivalent 0 1 3 0 0
Some college but no degree
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 18 23 11 9 1
Anti 0 0 3 2 1
Ambivalent 0 1 4 0 1
College degree
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 38 42 25 6 1
Anti 2 3 1 3 1
Ambivalent 0 1 3 1 0
Graduate degree
Self Auth Soc.Pr. Label No
Pro 15 17 25 6 0
Anti 2 1 3 3 0
Ambivalent 1 1 3 3 0
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The content analysis per level of education in Table 10 reveals
that the least analytical and least confident were the pro-vaccine
participants with a graduate degree. They maintained a neutral
tone and a rather low level of authenticity. We suspect that this
might be due to the their "unworthy debate" stance, which has
been observed to be the case in polarized debates on Twitter [65].
However, this result shows that the malware could potentially
nudge the highly educated, on-the-fence users to resort to silence
by implementing a logic that shows a rather rigid and dismissive
anti-vaccine sentiment [43]. In contrast, the most analytical are
the anti-vaccine participants with college and graduate degrees.
Although the tweeting confidence for these groups of participants
is very low (scores = 23.75, 1.07, and 2.31, respectively), as we have
seen before, they tend to be the most authentic (score = 88.50) and
use a positive tone (scores = 97.19 and 73.64, respectively).
Table 10: Opinion Content Analysis per Level of Education
pro-vaccine
Analytic Clout Authentic Tone
HS 40.38 39.87 63.54 73.64
SC 32.01 77.33 21.42 25.77
C 46.64 60.28 12.51 50.03
G 19.76 23.75 34.27 52.57
anti-vaccine
Analytic Clout Authentic Tone
C 51.25 1.07 88.50 97.19
G 52.71 2.31 43.37 1.00
5.3.2 Opinion Expression Actions. To explore how one authentic
representation influences the choice of an opinion expression action,
we ran an analysis for the pro-vaccine group which was presented
with the malware-manipulated post. When controlling for age, a
statistically significant difference was found only for the "start fol-
lowing the Twitter account" option - χ2 = 13.012, p = 0.023. The
participants in the [43 and older] bracket were less likely to start
following a Twitter account that presents an anti-vaccine climate of
opinion compared to the other age brackets. When controlling for
level of education, a statistically significant difference was found for
the "retweet the post" option - χ2 = 12.723, p = 0.005, and for the
"start following the Twitter account" option - χ2 = 7.856, p = 0.049.
The participants with a high school degree were more likely to
retweet the Twitter post and start following a Twitter account that
presents an anti-vaccine climate of opinion compared to the par-
ticipants with higher level of education. No statistical significance
was found for the relationships between gender identity and the
opinion expression actions on Twitter. These results reveal that a
malicious actor could aim to introduce misperception based on the
age and the level of education of a targeted Twitter user to push
them away from Twitter accounts with otherwise similar stances
to their own in regards to the vaccines’ effectiveness.
6 DISCUSSION
This study tested the possibility of engineering the spiral-of-silence
effect on Twitter by employing a malware-induced misperception
about vaccines’ risk of causing autism. The results, confirming
the dominant pro-vaccine sentiment on Twitter [7], show that
misperceiving a majority of opposing opinion climate is sufficient
to "nudge" a rather certain pro-vaccine user to refrain from tweeting
their personal opinion in response. The malware is able to "nudge"
the pro-vaccine users to refrain from any endorsement action as
liking, retweeting, blocking, or following an account. We extended
the analysis to see if the user authentic representation could be
used for profiling and targeting with the malware. The results show
that only user’s education level, and not age and gender, predicts
their susceptibility to malware-manipulated misperceptions. Age
matters only when a user decides to endorse a tweet, with the 43
years and older ones being less likely to do so.
We found, as evidenced in the previous spiral-of-silence stud-
ies, that the misperception-inducing malware could provoke self-
response for the pro-vaccine ones with "hard core" attitudes towards
the controversial issue debated [50], [20]. Their tweets conveyed
a stark, to-the-point, and often negative sentiment as a way of
disrupting the spiral-of-silence in a vaccines debate on Twitter.
We also found that the female anti-vaccine participants with "hard
core" attitudes could be nudged to disrupt the spiral-of-silence if the
malware was used to make an originally anti-vaccine tweet appear
as it is pro-vaccine (opposite of our study). We emulated a scenario
where participants, instead of tweeting their own response, were
given a choice to respond using a ready-made suggested response.
Our findings indicated that the recommended set of readily avail-
able tweets were a much more attractive strategy for the majority
of the participants, regardless of their attitude and perceived issue
importance of vaccines’ link to autism.
6.1 Defenses and Prevention
The first line of defense against misperception-inducing malware
would require elimination of any suspicious extensions in the
Chrome store that require permissions to control how the browser
text is presented to a user (alternatively a suspicious third-party
Twitter app from an App Store). An example of defense, along
the lines of malicious software detection, would be using trusted
browsers to detect JavaScript executions that are rearranging words
and sentences in the textual portion of an HTML document [34].
Another example is Chrome’s Manifest v3 API that is designed to
eliminate extensions exhibiting suspicious behaviour in content
manipulation [22]. Content-level signing might not help in these
regards because the content manipulation happens after the con-
tent integrity check in the sequence of HTML reception and display.
Even with these cautions, a malicious actor may find a way to de-
ploy the malware on a target’s browser (for example, an insider
threat). As with any social engineering tactic, awareness of trolling
and social bots campaigns on social media is an advantage to the
users and a second line of defense. We believe an analysis of the
Twitter content and metrics in the broader context of the issue
at stake could potently raise suspicion about the validity of the
perceived majority and minority opinions [39].
6.2 Vaccines Chatbot
The aforementioned awareness method might be costly and incon-
venient for most of the Twitter users who do want to participate
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in the vaccines debate on Twitter. For this purpose, we offered an
option for the participants to use a ready-made response as a way
of disrupting the spiral-of-silence effect. The overwhelmingly posi-
tive results inspired us to develop an assistive chatbot that could
be useful in countering the effect of the malware but also any ac-
tual troll or a social bot. We got this idea from the custom chatbot
Facebook created for its employees to use when going home for
Thanksgiving [17]. The purpose of this chatbot is to offer a ready
made-response to the employees and help them break out of the
spiral-of-silence in case their families created a hostile climate of
opinion towards Facebook, i.e. confronted them with questions
about the perceived inadequacies in Facebook’s dealing with issues
like election meddling and data surveillance.
For our chatbot, we took a "hostile opinion climate" tweet that
the user would be tempted to respond to as an input in a machine
learning algorithm that suggested the best tweet response from
hundreds of existing twitter responses as an output. To select a
response, the algorithm calculated the response that was the closest
to the input based on the Euclidean distance, with an additional
random number added (to help prevent ties, and to help alternate
between responses), measured using features of whether a key-
word from a given anti-vaccine or pro-vaccine sentiment exists
in the tweets [7]. For our implementation we used a corpus of
originally pro-vaccine tweets by the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) and applied the misperception-inducing logic to to fit an anti-
vaccine agenda to meet the participant preferences in our study.
Although we presented the outputs of the chatbot as suggested
opinion expression strategies, one is able to implement this chatbot
in a single Excel workbook, allowing a them to copy and paste a
"hostile opinion climate" tweet into the Excel workbook and the
workbook would suggest a response to the user. This is a low-cost
and easy implementation because does not require any program-
ming knowledge or experience Excel is commonly available tool
(the implementation logic is available on demand).
6.3 Limitations and Future Work
Though the results of this study suggest that covertly induced mis-
perception with a malware could engineer the spiral-of-silence
effect in a Twitter debate on vaccines, caution is warranted when
interpreting them. The use of a controlled tweet allowed us to cap-
ture the initial reaction of the participants, but a tweet with multiple
comments, different content and metrics, or multiple tweets in a
series could have a different effect on the opinion expression be-
havior. The polarizing topic, the attitude certainty, and the issue
importance affected the distribution of our sample, which in turn
also limits the generalization of the results. We didn’t explicitly
ask whether participants will express their opinion if anonymity is
granted, but further research should test the malware effect under
conditions of anonymity. The malware was tested in its extension
variant, but there are many people that access Twitter through
smartphone applications or multiple interfaces in the same time.
There is a possibility that the same results might not be obtained
because smartphone applications provide a different set of inter-
action affordances and multiple interfaces contribute to repetitive
exposure to the same information which can lead to changes in
perceptions about the issue importance and one’s attitude certainty.
The outcomes of the study may be different if user awareness about
this malware is raised, as it is usually the case with similar manipu-
lation tactics. The malware tactic might be hard to scale up quickly
to a large Twitter population like the trolling or social bots do, but
that is what makes the malware compelling to a malicious actor
interested in micro-targeting users.
For our next research steps we plan to replicate and extend the
current study with Reddit to explore whether the affordances of this
particular social media platform affects the malware effectiveness.
Our plan is also to cover other polarizing topics popular on Twitter,
for example a pandemic virus or responses to the president’s tweets.
We will work on diversifying our future samples and control for
other demographic and cultural factors to get a more nuanced idea
of how a spiral-of-silence effect, engineered by a covert malware,
might unfold in the future for a purpose of a covert, low-intensity
political propaganda. Towards a more robust test of the malware,
the future research will investigate whether a different packaging,
e.g. a third-party smartphone twitter application, could amplify
or attenuate the misperception-inducing potential of the malware.
Another line of research will continue to explore machine learn-
ing mechanisms for automated decision making on what type of
content rearrangement is the best suited for a particular polarizing
issue, target, or a social media platform. Our objective in future re-
search is not to perpetuate any deviant cybersecurity behaviour, but
rather the contrary. We are strongly dedicated to investigating any
facet of this opinion manipulation method to be able to eradicate it
with both technological and societal prevention mechanisms.
6.4 Ethical Implications
The ethical implications of our study are the same as those related to
publishing any vulnerability: the value of publicly sharing a proof-
of-concept exploit with knowledgeable researchers outweighs the
opportunity that potential attackers may benefit from the publi-
cation. If this paper introduces a viable attack in the social media
ecosystem due to its simplistic nature, we believe that this might be
merely a confirmation of similar exploits, independently developed
and deployed by well-resourced malicious actors. The study itself
tests the plausibility of a locally developed browser extension (not
publicly available on the Chrome store). In the context of a real-life
malware, a responsible disclosure would entail contacting Google,
the developers of Chrome, and working with them through the
details of the malware extension.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduced a misperception-inducing malware
as a means of covert opinion manipulation of polarized discourse
on Twitter. We tested it with 315 participants and showed that
the malware attack has the potential to silence users in both ex-
pressing their opinion or taking any opinion endorsement actions.
Our main contribution is the evidence that the spiral-of-silence
effect can be induced on demand only with a piece of seemingly
benign JavaScript (or other software) code and without fabricating
any tweets or using bot accounts. We hope our results inform the
security community about the implications of having an alterna-
tive method for social media influence, at least in a micro-targeted
variant.
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